Brandsit

Tag: Geopolitics

  • Buy European: China announces retaliation for new EU law

    Buy European: China announces retaliation for new EU law

    For decades, the European economy has been based on a paradigm of maximum openness, often at the expense of its own industrial base. Today, we are witnessing a historic turnaround. The regulations proposed by Brussels – from tougher cyber security standards to the ‘Buy European’ (Industrial Accelerator Act) – are not just a defensive response to global turmoil, but above all an ambitious plan to reclaim Europe’s role as a technological leader. Beijing’s vehement opposition, which has taken the form of diplomatic warnings in recent days, is the best evidence that the European Union has finally begun to define its national interests effectively.

    Power diplomacy: Brussels begins to speak with one voice

    China’s Ministry of Commerce and diplomats in Beijing accuse the EU of ‘double standards’ and violating free trade rules. But from an analytical perspective, what Beijing calls discrimination, for European business is a levelling of the playing field. For years, Chinese giants have benefited from subsidies and a protected internal market, expanding in Europe on terms that were unattainable for EU companies in China.

    China’ s current diplomatic offensive – letters to the European Commission and lobbying in capitals – confirms that the EU’s de-risking strategy has real leverage. The EU is ceasing to be merely a market and is becoming a standard-setter, which in the long term will ensure greater predictability and operational stability within the community.

    Cyber security as a foundation for trust

    A key pillar of the new strategy is the elimination of components from ‘high-risk’ suppliers in critical sectors. China is calling for these definitions to be removed, seeing them as a barrier to companies like Huawei. However, technological sovereignty is not a luxury but a cornerstone of national security, especially in times as geopolitically unstable as the present.

    From a market perspective, this process is stimulating a new wave of innovation within the EU:

    • Support for homegrown integrators: Reducing the share of non-trusted suppliers opens up space for European companies such as Ericsson and Nokia, as well as the growing Open RAN sector.
    • Integrity by design: European safety standards are becoming a global quality certificate, which could become a new export asset for EU technology.

    Industrial Accelerator Act: A new era for European innovation

    The ‘Buy European’ law is not an act of protectionism, but a strategy to build a healthy industrial ecosystem. Using public procurement to promote local manufacturing and low-carbon standards is a mechanism that aims to:

    1. Stimulating the energy transition: Promoting goods with a low carbon footprint forces global suppliers to innovate, while giving a technological edge to European manufacturers.
    2. Protection of intellectual property: Beijing’s opposition to technology transfer legislation shows that the EU is effectively safeguarding its most valuable assets against uncontrolled leakage of know-how.

    The introduction of a requirement for EU-produced content in public contracts is not a barrier, but an invitation to real investment on the continent. Companies that choose to build factories and research centres in Europe will gain stable and preferential access to one of the world’s largest markets.

    Investment in stability

    Although China is threatening ‘countermeasures’, the analysis of economic interdependence indicates that both sides have too much at stake to bring about a full-blown rupture of relations. For business, the following conclusions are key:

    • Reshoring and Nearshoring: building industrial sovereignty in the EU will shorten supply chains, drastically reducing the geopolitical risks that have destabilised production in recent years.
    • Growth of the local R&D sector: The need to replace some imported technologies with our own solutions will force an increase in R&D spending, which will raise the competitiveness of the European IT sector within a decade.
    • New partnerships: Diversifying suppliers (e.g. towards India or Vietnam) in response to Chinese restrictions will make European companies more resilient to economic blackmail.

    Empowerment through sovereignty

    Building the ‘Digital Fortress of the EU’ is in fact building the foundations for a modern, independent and competitive economy. Transitional tensions with Beijing are the natural result of correcting long-standing imbalances. For European entrepreneurs, Brussels’ current course means a return to the highest stakes game – not as sub-suppliers, but as technology owners and standard setters.

    Strategic autonomy does not mean isolation, but the right to choose partners on their own terms. In the long term, it is this assertiveness that will make Europe a more attractive and credible place to do business, where innovation goes hand in hand with security and values.

  • The war in Iran and cloud pricing – How geopolitics is hitting the IT sector

    The war in Iran and cloud pricing – How geopolitics is hitting the IT sector

    The modern global economy resembles an intricate network of interconnected vessels, in which a tremor caused at one point on the globe resonates with unexpected force at the opposite end. While it might seem that the sterile, air-conditioned halls of Europe’s data centres are separated by an infinite distance from the dust and chaos of the Middle East, reality brutally verifies this belief.

    Today’s technology, despite its apparent ethereality, remains deeply rooted in the physicality of raw materials and the stability of trade routes. What is happening in the bottleneck of the Strait of Hormuz is not just a local armed incident, but a direct impetus adjusting the IT sector’s operating margins globally.

    This phenomenon can be described as a geopolitical risk premium. The market for digital services has ceased to respond solely to classic supply and demand mechanisms and has begun to price uncertainty. When the world’s key energy arteries are compromised, the price of technology rises not because the power socket has run out, but because the cost of maintaining the stability of this flow becomes dramatically higher.

    The foundation of any cloud infrastructure is energy. In Europe’s energy mix, natural gas still acts as the marginal price-setting fuel. Any disruption in the Middle East, which is the planet’s energy granary, immediately translates into higher electricity bills, which the operators of large server farms have to pay to keep their computing processes running.

    Often seen as an immaterial entity, the cloud actually ‘breathes’ electricity, and its breath becomes more expensive the more turbulent the regions of fossil fuel extraction.

    The situation is complicated by the fact that modern data centres are facilities designed for absolute reliability. Guaranteeing service availability of more than ninety-nine per cent relies on extensive emergency power systems. These generators, which are the last line of defence against a blackout, run on diesel.

    Rising oil prices therefore directly increase the cost of maintaining operational readiness. These accumulating energy costs cease to be just a spreadsheet item and become a barrier to entry for innovative projects, especially when AI, with its exponentially growing appetite for computing power, is developing rapidly.

    When analysing the supply chain, it is important to recognise that the impact of conflict goes far beyond energy alone. The logistics of IT equipment, including the transport of servers, disk arrays and advanced components, is extremely sensitive to fluctuations in transport fuel prices. However, even more acute, although less visible, is the increase in the cost of associated services.

    Geopolitical instability is forcing logistics and insurance companies to renegotiate rates. Risk premiums in maritime and air transport act as a hidden tax that ultimately burdens the end customer’s wallet.

    A particularly worrying aspect is the fate of critical raw materials such as helium supplied from Qatar. This gas is indispensable in the production of state-of-the-art semiconductors. A transport blockade in the region could paralyse factories in Taiwan, with a consequent return to the days of drastic component shortages.

    From a bizneus perspective, this means having to abandon the ‘just in time’ delivery strategy in favour of building up costly strategic reserves.

    The current balance of power on the world map is forcing a redefinition of digital asset placement strategies. Technological security today is also a geographical analysis. Cloud regions located in countries with high political risk are losing their attractiveness, while countries offering a stable energy mix, based on nuclear or renewables, are becoming new bastions of operational sovereignty.

    A key task for executives therefore becomes optimising cloud costs through advanced FinOps practices. IT financial management is now part of a company’s defence strategy.

    Understanding that every inefficiency in application code or unused server instance is a waste of resources that are becoming scarcer and more expensive is fundamental to modern technology leadership.

    In conclusion, the conflict in the Strait of Hormuz region represents a test of sorts for the resilience of the global technology sector. It demonstrates emphatically that the digital world is not isolated from tectonic shocks in geopolitics.

    Business must accept the new reality that energy inflation and supply uncertainty are constants in the equation. Adapting to these conditions requires, first and foremost, a deep awareness that cloud stability begins where dependence on uncertain energy sources and threatened trade routes ends.

  • AI needs energy. Will the lack of a nuclear power plant slow down Poland’s technological development?

    AI needs energy. Will the lack of a nuclear power plant slow down Poland’s technological development?

    Driven by the unprecedented development of artificial intelligence, today’s digital economy seems to be operating in a kind of paradox. On the one hand, the world delights in the intangible nature of algorithms, the lightness of cloud computing and the finesse of generative models that redefine the concept of productivity. On the other hand, however, this digital superstructure is set on an extremely heavy physical foundation: energy infrastructure. Artificial intelligence, hailed as the new electricity of our time, paradoxically exhibits an insatiable hunger for this traditional, socket-flowing energy. In a public debate dominated by considerations of code ethics or data security, too little attention is paid to the fundamental question: where will the electricity necessary to power this revolution come from, so that the process is stable, clean and strategically secure.

    Data from reports by the International Energy Agency leave no illusions about the scale of the challenge. It is estimated that the global energy consumption of data centres could double as early as 2030 as a direct consequence of the expansion of cloud computing and the training of increasingly complex language models. However, this is just the tip of the iceberg, underneath which lies the massive digitalisation of the entire industrial, transport and residential sectors. Projections indicate that by 2035, data centres alone will require an additional 1,000 terawatt hours, but the needs of the rest of the economy will increase by nearly six times this figure. Global energy demand, according to analysis by Rystad Energy, is expected to increase by almost a third in just a decade. In this context, the traditional approach to the energy transition, based solely on classic renewables, is showing its limitations.

    The business and technology sector is facing the need to redefine the concept of operational stability. Indeed, digital security is inextricably linked to the security of power supply, and this requires a source that is not only environmentally friendly, but above all controllable and independent of the vagaries of the weather or geopolitical turmoil.

    This is where fusion energy comes onto the scene, which has undergone a fascinating transformation in recent years from the domain of science fiction literature to the realm of hard business strategy. Major players in the global technology market, such as Microsoft, Google and Amazon, have long since abandoned their role as passive observers and become active investors in fusion projects. Cumulative funding in private fusion companies has risen to €13 billion by 2025, an eightfold increase from the beginning of the decade. The involvement of IT leaders is not driven by philanthropic motives, but by a pragmatic risk assessment. Having a stake in a technology that generates almost unlimited and pure power is an insurance policy for further innovation.

    However, the current investment landscape reveals a worrying asymmetry for Europe. The US accounts for more than half of global fusion investment, treating the technology as an element of national security and competitive advantage. The US government’s change of stance at the end of 2025, making fusion a strategic priority, clearly defines the rules of the new game. Right behind America is China, pumping huge state resources into building its own energy ecosystem. Such a bipolar panorama should be an alarm bell for European decision-makers. The continent cannot afford to repeat the mistake made in the semiconductor sector or in artificial intelligence itself, where marginalisation has led to deep dependence on external suppliers and technologies.

    What about Europe?

    With the demand for computing power growing exponentially, building a sovereign and inexhaustible source of power is becoming an absolute requirement for maintaining the competitiveness of the modern economy. This paradigm shift, although seen in the silicon valleys of the world, took on particular political weight at the recent Nuclear Energy Summit in Paris. It was there that the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, uttered words that, to many, sound like a belated but necessary thumping of the chest: Europe’s turn away from the atom was a strategic mistake, and the figures describing this regression speak for themselves.

    Acknowledging that the systematic extinguishment of the nuclear sector on the Old Continent – a decline in its share from a third in 1990 to just fifteen per cent today – was a geopolitical blunder directs attention to the challenges facing the technology sector. Today’s digital economy, fascinated by the lightness of artificial intelligence algorithms, is in violent collision with the physical reality of transmission networks. Often referred to as an immaterial revolution, artificial intelligence displays an insatiable hunger for stable, clean and cheap energy. In this context, Europe’s dependence on unstable fossil fuel imports is becoming not only an economic ballast but, above all, a development barrier that could relegate the continent to the role of a technological open-air museum.

    Poland’s situation in this new deal appears particularly dramatic and requires immediate strategic reflection. While the leaders of the European Union are beating their chests and drawing up plans for a return to nuclear power, the Polish energy landscape remains afflicted by the historic lack of even a single operational nuclear power plant. This structural shortage, at a time of expansion of generative models and data processing centres, ceases to be merely a matter of energy security and becomes a considerable problem for the Polish IT sector. Ambitions to build an innovation hub on the Vistula and develop indigenous artificial intelligence systems may be effectively stifled by the lack of a foundation of stable network base load.

    Investors planning to build large-scale data centres are guided by pragmatism, in which the availability of low-carbon and uninterruptible energy plays a key role. Poland, basing its energy mix on declining coal and rapidly growing but weather-dependent renewables, without a ‘nuclear stabiliser’ becomes a location with high operational risk. Not only does the absence of nuclear mean higher emission costs affecting the margins of technology companies, but above all the lack of a guarantee of power continuity, without which advanced training of AI models is simply impossible. As a result, the most valuable digital projects may bypass Polish soil, choosing countries that have been able to turn nuclear pragmatism into a competitive advantage.

    The clear change of course in Brussels, emphasising the role of small modular reactors and nuclear fusion, should be a signal for Polish business to mobilise. Since the European Union intends to allocate billions of euros to fusion research as part of the ITER project and to create guarantees for private investment in a new generation of nuclear technologies, Poland cannot afford to be a passive observer. It is necessary to create mechanisms that will allow Polish technology companies to actively participate in building a value chain for the nuclear sector. Fusion, although still seen as the horizon of the future, is today the only real answer to the energy blackmail facing the digital world.

    The geopolitical race for control of the earth’s ‘artificial sun’ is gathering pace. The United States, considering the development of fusion technology as a matter of national security, and China, heavily funding state nuclear projects, have created a bipolar power structure. Europe, if it does not want to become a mere client of these powers, must develop its own model of cooperation – a kind of ‘Eurofighter of Energy’. This comparison to a European fighter is not coincidental; building a modern fusion-based energy system requires an analogous scale of industrial, scientific and financial coordination. For Poland, participation in this endeavour is a chance to leapfrog several stages of technological backwardness and enter directly into the elite of tomorrow’s energy management countries.

    It is worth noting that nuclear fusion offers more than just electricity – it offers sovereignty. When defence systems, critical infrastructure and everyday communications are based on artificial intelligence, any interruption in energy supply becomes an attack vector. A stable, indigenous source of power, located close to decision-making and technology centres, is the best shield against external pressures. What this means for Polish business is that more pressure needs to be exerted to accelerate nuclear projects, not only in the traditional sense, but especially in the area of innovative SMR and fusion technologies that can be implemented closer to the industrial consumer.

    The diagnosis made by Ursula von der Leyen is painful but invigorating for the European debate. Europe, and Poland in particular, must reject preconceptions in favour of engineering realism. Artificial intelligence will not wait for energy systems to keep up with its needs; it will simply move to where energy is abundant, cheap and clean. Poland, facing the historic challenge of building its first reactor, must understand that this is not a building project, but the foundation of a future digital power. Without the atom, the dream of Polish artificial intelligence will remain just a beautiful code written on servers that will be impossible to run. It is time for an honest analysis of the numbers and strategic shortcomings to become the impetus for building the energy sovereignty that will allow innovation to fully flourish on our soil.

  • Conflict in the Middle East and electronics prices: What lies ahead for the IT industry in 2026?

    Conflict in the Middle East and electronics prices: What lies ahead for the IT industry in 2026?

    The armed conflict involving Iran, the United States and Israel sheds new light on a fundamental paradox of modernity: the world’s most advanced technologies are being held hostage to resource extraction processes whose logistics rely on the stability of regions that have for decades been described as powder kegs.

    Fundamental to the current unrest in the high-tech industry has been the issue of the availability of helium, a noble gas whose role in the process of semiconductor lithography cannot be overestimated. While the public associates helium with entertainment applications or medical MRI equipment, for chipmakers it is an essential coolant and a medium for maintaining thermal stability in the most precise manufacturing equipment. The fact that nearly thirty-eight per cent of the world’s production of this raw material is concentrated in Qatar creates a dangerous tipping point in the global supply chain. QatarEnergy’s decision to declare a state of force majeure, prompted by attacks on refining infrastructure, is a wake-up call for the entire silicon ecosystem. Halting operations at natural gas processing plants means not only a shortage of fuel, but more importantly an interruption in the supply of petrochemical components, without which modern electronics cannot function.

    However, the problem goes far beyond helium alone. Market analyses show the industry’s deep dependence on fourteen other critical materials from the Middle East, including bromine and specialised process gases. In the semiconductor sector, where purity standards are measured at the nanoscale, switching suppliers is not a simple logistical operation. It is a process of months of validation and rigorous quality testing, violations of which could destroy entire production runs worth hundreds of millions of dollars. In the face of protracted conflict, the flexibility of giants such as TSMC, Samsung and GlobalFoundry is being put to its toughest test since the global pandemic, with the current crisis being far more structural and unpredictable.

    The geopolitical Gordian knot remains the Strait of Hormuz. A key artery for global energy trade, this narrow maritime isthmus also acts as a fuse for global digital transformation. The blockade or significant obstruction of shipping in this body of water is hitting the cost of the energy required to power giant server farms and the price of polymers used in the manufacture of computer components with a ricochet. The observed increase in energy prices is therefore not just a transport issue, but a direct operating cost for any company operating a SaaS model or cloud infrastructure provider. The disruption to supply in this region is forcing a shift away from the previous dogma of just-in-time logistics management to costly strategic stock-building strategies, which will inevitably impact the operating margins of the technology sector.

    This situation is particularly acute in the context of the unprecedented demand for computing power generated by the development of artificial intelligence. The industry is in ticks: on the one hand, demand for advanced computing units is growing exponentially, while on the other hand, production capacity is encountering a raw material glass ceiling. The risk of technological involution is becoming real and may manifest itself not only in delays in the release of new generations of processors, but above all in the forced cannibalisation of resources. Sectors such as automotive or industrial automation may be forced to compete for the same limited chip resources with technology giants, leading to drastic price increases for end devices and stifling digitalisation in less profitable industries.

    Undisrupted globalisation, in which access to technology was guaranteed by efficient market mechanisms, is a thing of the past. It is now giving way to an era of strategic resilience. The stability of the Middle East has become a key element of technological security for any business using digital working tools. The current crisis shows that the future of artificial intelligence and global connectivity depends on the permeability of sea lanes and the political stability of raw material exporting countries, which are often forgotten in the daily pursuit of innovation.

    Managing an organisation in 2026 therefore requires not only proficiency in anticipating market trends, but also a deep understanding of the physical map of the world. The cost of technology ceases to be a function of the progress of miniaturisation and becomes a product of the security price of physical assets. In this new reality, the winners will be those who can integrate geopolitical risk analysis with technology planning, understanding that the blue gas in Qatar’s tanks has a direct impact on the fluidity of a mobile app in Europe or the agility of an ERP system in North America. The Middle East is now becoming the catalyst for a major shift in the way the world thinks about technology: no longer as an unlimited resource, but as a precious asset whose foundations are extremely vulnerable to shocks.

    Further developments between Tehran and Washington will determine whether the current perturbations turn out to be merely a short-term shock or the beginning of a profound reconfiguration of the global technological order. The illusion of the autonomy of the digital world from the problems of the physical world has finally been dispelled. It is therefore worth keeping a close eye not only on the stock market quotations of technology companies, but also on the movements of ships in the Gulf, as this is where the source code for next year’s IT sector margins is currently being written.

  • The battle for semiconductors. Where is the EU’s place in this clash?

    The battle for semiconductors. Where is the EU’s place in this clash?

    Spring 2026 brings to the technology markets a picture full of stark contrasts. On the one hand, the world’s digital economy is reveling in the possibilities of generative artificial intelligence, which has become the foundation of the operational strategies of major companies. On the other hand, this foundation – based on the physical infrastructure of semiconductors – is showing cracks due to tensions whose nature goes far beyond pure business. Recent analyses suggest that we are on the threshold of a profound redefinition of the global ICT sector – the relationship between the superpowers has become its main regulator, creating a phenomenon that can be described as the Silicon Iron Curtain.

    The current market situation is seemingly paradoxical. According to available data, global semiconductor sales are showing impressive dynamism, with growth of 18.8% this year, continuing last year’s trend when the rate was almost 23%. The driving force behind this phenomenon remains the unrelenting demand for the most advanced chips dedicated to data centres and artificial intelligence models. However, behind these optimistic figures lies an architecture of uncertainty. Production in the electronics and ICT sector, while maintaining its high growth rate of 10.3% this year, is forecast to cool noticeably in 2027, falling to 6.5%. This deceleration is not due to market saturation, but to increasing structural and political barriers that are beginning to hamper the free flow of innovation.

    The biggest shadow cast over the future of the sector is the deepening polarisation between the US and China. Tightening rhetoric and trade policy tools are turning global supply chains into a battleground for technological dominance. A scenario in which tariffs are imposed on electronic products with no exceptions is a viable planning option for technology company managements. Such a situation forces organisations to move away from the previous paradigm of maximum cost optimisation to building geopolitical resilience. Access to the latest processors can be restricted by a single administrative decision, so stability becomes a more valuable currency than ad hoc margins.

    In this complex balance of power, Europe appears to be in a particularly challenging position. The data here are inexorable – while the global average for the sector’s growth hovers around 10%, the forecast for the Old Continent for 2026 is a modest 1.3%. This disparity is the result of the specific structure of the European electronics industry. The region has traditionally specialised in the production of components for the automotive and industrial sectors. While this is a strategy consistent with Europe’s historical economic profile, it is proving insufficient. Lacking a strong manufacturing base for high-end chips, the European economy is losing ground in the most profitable and strategic high-tech areas.

    Initiatives by EU authorities, such as the EU Chips Act, attempt to reverse this negative trend. The plan to invest €43 billion in local production and research aims not only to reduce dependence on Asian suppliers, but also to gain a 20% share of global production by 2030. However, sound analysis suggests that achieving this goal will be an extremely difficult task. Building an advanced semiconductor factory is a multi-year process, requiring not only a huge amount of capital, but above all unique know-how and access to rare raw materials and lithographic technologies that are currently concentrated outside Europe.

    An interesting, and somewhat unexpected, factor in the revival of the European ICT sector is becoming a shift in defence policy priorities. The increase in military spending, particularly evident in Germany, is creating a new space for technological investment. The modernisation of the army in the 21st century is largely about the digitalisation of the battlefield, forcing the development of local expertise in advanced electronics and secure communications systems. For business, this means the emergence of a new, stable source of demand that can stimulate innovations that can later be adapted in the civilian sector. However, for these economies of scale to occur, there needs to be close cooperation between the public and private sectors and flexibility to adapt military technologies for commercial use.

    From a strategic business management perspective, the coming years will require a redefinition of the concept of technological security. Reliance on a single source of supply, especially from regions of high political risk, is becoming an anachronism. Businesses face the need to diversify not only geographically, but also technologically. It is worth noting the growing importance of alternative architectures and the search for suppliers in third countries that can act as buffers in the conflict of giants. It is also becoming crucial to audit one’s own infrastructure for vulnerability to a sudden cut-off of technical support or hardware updates coming from overseas or the Far East.

  • Russian military intelligence was behind December’s cyber attack on Poland’s critical infrastructure

    Russian military intelligence was behind December’s cyber attack on Poland’s critical infrastructure

    The December attempt to paralyse the Polish electricity system, attributed by ESET analysts to the Russian group Sandworm, is a critical point of reference for utility leaders in Central Europe. Although Prime Minister Donald Tusk and the Ministry of Climate and Environment confirmed that the integrity of the grid was preserved, the operation exposes a new risk dynamic in the region.

    According to the findings of experts from Slovakia-based ESET, the attackers used a tool called DynoWiper. This is wiper software whose sole purpose is to irretrievably destroy data on infected workstations, rendering control systems useless in practice. The technical coincidence of the code with previous operations of Sandworm – a unit directly linked to the Russian military intelligence service GRU – leaves no illusions about the intentions: the aim was not to steal data, but to cause a physical blackout.

    For executives, the temporal context is crucial. The attack came exactly on the tenth anniversary of the same group’s strike on Ukraine’s power grid, which went down in history as the first case of digital blackout. The fact that Poland – a key logistics hub for Ukraine – became the target of such an aggressive operation suggests that the critical infrastructure of NATO countries is no longer a ‘no-go zone’ for destructive cyber activities.

    From a business perspective, the incident is forcing a revision of the resilience strategy. The successful defence of the Polish system, described by Minister Milosz Motyka as the most serious test in years, proves that investments in network segmentation and advanced traffic analytics are yielding a real return. However, the emergence of DynoWiper signals that traditional backup systems may be insufficient if recovery processes are not fully isolated from the core operational infrastructure.

  • An invisible front over the Baltic. How Russia’s electronic warfare is testing Europe’s resilience

    An invisible front over the Baltic. How Russia’s electronic warfare is testing Europe’s resilience

    Sunday evening. A plane with the President of the European Commission on board is approaching a landing in Bulgaria. At a crucial moment, minutes before touching down on the runway, the pilots lose access to the essential navigation tool of the 21st century – the GPS signal.

    The systems that modern aviation relies on go silent and the crew has to resort to older, ground-based technology. This was no ordinary malfunction. What the Bulgarian government openly calls a deliberate cyber attack by Russia was a digital warning shot.

    This incident, although happily concluded, is not an isolated incident. It is a symptom of a much wider phenomenon – a silent, invisible war being waged on the airwaves over Europe, in which the security and technological sovereignty of an entire continent is at stake.

    Warfare 2.0 – what is radio-electronic warfare (WRE)?

    For most of us, war is associated with images familiar from newsreels. However, the modern battlefield is increasingly moving into the electromagnetic spectrum.

    A key element of this transformation is Radio Electronic Warfare (RAW), i.e. any military action aimed at controlling, disrupting or deceiving an adversary’s electronic systems. In the context of satellite navigation, Russian activities usually take two forms.

    The first, more violent, is jamming. It can be likened to trying to drown out a conversation by turning up loud music. Powerful terrestrial transmitters emit strong ‘noise’ on GPS frequencies, preventing receivers in planes, ships or our phones from picking up the weak signal from orbiting satellites.

    The second, much more sophisticated and dangerous method is spoofing (falsification). This is no longer jamming, but whispering false information. Instead of blocking the signal, WRE systems send out crafted, false data that tricks the receiver. As a result, the aircraft ‘thinks’ it is several tens of kilometres away and the ship at sea is given a course that leads straight into the shoals.

    The aim of both is digital paralysis: to blind and stun the opponent, to undermine trust in technology and to demonstrate the ability to take control of the invisible infrastructure on which we all depend.

    The Baltic Sea as a testing ground

    The epicentre of this silent war is right on our borders. Since the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine in 2022, the Baltic region – and Poland, Finland and the Baltic states in particular – has become the scene of massive and prolonged GPS signal disruptions.

    This is confirmed not only by official warnings from governments, but also by data from public air traffic monitoring systems, which regularly show huge ‘holes’ in satellite navigation coverage.

    Russia’s Kaliningrad region is identified as the likely source of most interference. This heavily militarised exclave is saturated with some of the world’s most modern WRE systems, such as Krasukh-4 and Murmansk-BN, capable of disrupting signals over a radius of hundreds of kilometres.

    The Baltic has become a testing ground for Russia to test its capabilities in real-world conditions while probing NATO defence systems.

    Digital ‘maskirovka’: Why is Russia doing it?

    These operations are not accidental, but are part of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy, known as maskirovka – the art of deception and concealment of true intentions. The objectives of these operations are multidimensional:

    1 NATO defence testing: Russia is testing how the Alliance responds to disruption. Do civilian and military pilots have alternative procedures? How resilient are the defence systems and how quickly can they identify the source of an attack?

    2. a demonstration of strength: A clear signal sent to the West: “We control your skies and sea, even without a single gunshot”. It is a form of intimidation and power projection.

    3 Creating a protective ‘bubble’: WRE systems create an invisible shield around strategic facilities in Kaliningrad to protect them from possible attack with GPS-guided precision munitions.

    4 Sowing chaos and uncertainty: Every disrupted flight and every ship forced to change course undermines confidence in the Western technology on which global logistics and transport are based.

    From the cockpit to critical infrastructure – what’s at stake?

    The impact of these actions goes far beyond minor inconveniences. In civil aviation, as the incident with Ursula von der Leyen’s plane showed, passenger safety is at stake. In maritime transport, where 90% of global trade is carried by sea, signal falsification can lead to disasters.

    However, the real threat is even deeper. GPS is not just about location, it is also a global time standard, crucial for synchronising mobile networks, stock market transactions and energy systems. A deliberate, massive attack on this infrastructure could have cascading, hard-to-predict effects on the entire economy.

    In this context, a fundamental question resurfaced after the Bulgarian incident: Can the European army rely on GPS for drone or missile guidance at this point?

    The effectiveness of ‘smart’ munitions, the backbone of modern armed forces, comes into question when the enemy is able to take away their ‘eyes and ears’.

    An arms race in the ether

    Electronic warfare is no longer a theory, but an everyday reality at Europe’s gates. It is a quiet front where our technological resilience is being tested.

    In response, the West is stepping up work to make its own systems more resilient – from strengthening the encrypted signals of Europe’s Galileo system to investing in constellations of satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO) to provide redundancy.

    The old iron curtain was constructed of steel and concrete. The new digital curtain of the 21st century may be woven from invisible electromagnetic waves, effectively cutting off regions from key technologies. The race for dominance in the ether is already underway.

  • TSMC raises prices. Tech giants and consumers will pay for geopolitics

    TSMC raises prices. Tech giants and consumers will pay for geopolitics

    Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co.(TSMC), a key chipmaker for companies such as Apple, Nvidia and AMD, plans to significantly increase the price of its most advanced semiconductors.

    According to industry reports, the increase could be as high as 10%, a signal of rising costs at the heart of the global technology supply chain.

    The main reason for this decision is the financial pressure from US trade policy and the increasing costs of global expansion. Although TSMC does most of its manufacturing in Taiwan, the company is facing costs related to import duties imposed by the US.

    Until now, the Taiwanese giant has largely absorbed these burdens to remain competitive. However, ongoing geopolitical tensions and pressure on margins have prompted management to change its strategy.

    The decision to pass on costs to customers is also linked to TSMC’s massive investments in the US. The construction of state-of-the-art factories in Arizona, partly financed by CHIPS Act subsidies, is aimed at geographically diversifying production and mitigating future customs risks.

    These strategic but capital-intensive projects generate additional costs, which the company intends to compensate for by adjusting price lists.

    As the undisputed market leader in the production of the most advanced chips (below 5 nm), TSMC is in a position to dictate terms. Price increases will almost certainly be passed down the value chain.

    Manufacturers such as Apple and Nvidia, facing higher component costs, are likely to revise the prices of their flagship products – from iPhones to GeForce graphics cards.

    As a result, the rising costs and geopolitical reshuffling of the semiconductor industry will ultimately be paid for by the consumer.

    TSMC’s decision clearly shows that the era of low-cost, globally produced chips may be coming to an end, with higher prices driven by national security strategies and regionalisation of production becoming the new norm.

  • A secret supply route for Russian armaments has been uncovered. Traces lead to Siemens and China

    A secret supply route for Russian armaments has been uncovered. Traces lead to Siemens and China

    Russian state-owned arms factory Biysk Oleum (BOZ) has acquired advanced production automation equipment from Siemens, despite the sanctions in place.

    Information disclosed by Reuters indicates that there is a complex supply chain to circumvent international technology restrictions.

    A Kaliningrad-based intermediary, Techpribor, played a key role in the operation. It was this company, according to the investigation, that ordered the equipment from Chinese distributors such as Huizhou Funn Tek and New Source Automation.

    Journalists confirmed that the equipment that eventually arrived at the BOZ factory matched the Siemens models included in the order. The Chinese suppliers admitted that they had not been asked by the German company about the final recipient of the technology.

    The purchase is directly related to the intensive capacity expansion of the BOZ plant, which has been increasing production of explosives, including hexogen (RDX), since the start of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

    Faced with staff shortages, automation has become a priority for the Russian defence industry to increase productivity. Investment in the modernisation of the Siberian plant, owned by the sanctioned Ya.M. Sverdlov concern, is estimated at more than 15.5 billion roubles.

    Siemens asserts its commitment to complying with sanctions and requires its partners to do so, but admits that goods can enter Russia without its knowledge through complex networks of intermediaries.

    The case sheds light on China’s growing role as a conduit for the supply of Western technology to the Russian arms sector. In response, the European Union began imposing sanctions directly on Chinese companies supporting Russian aggression from December 2024, expanding the list in July 2025 and increasing diplomatic pressure on Beijing.