Brandsit

Category: Legislation and regulations

  • Why is Microsoft standing up for Anthropic?

    Why is Microsoft standing up for Anthropic?

    In Silicon Valley, the competition for dominance in the artificial intelligence sector usually resembles an arms race. However, in the face of bureaucratic pressure from the Department of Defence (DOD), the major players have decided to close ranks. Microsoft has officially backed Anthropic ‘s request to block the Pentagon’s decision to declare model developer Claude a ‘supply chain risk’.

    Pragmatism instead of solidarity

    For Microsoft, intervening in federal court in San Francisco is not just a gesture of goodwill towards a competitor. It is a cold business calculation. The Redmond giant has integrated Anthropic’s technology into solutions provided to the US military. Suddenly cutting off access to these models would call into question the continuity of defence contracts and force engineers to make costly, hasty rebuilds of systems.

    Microsoft argues that by giving itself six months to withdraw from Anthropic’s technology, the Pentagon has forgotten about an analogous transition period for third-party contractors. Without the court-ordered withholding of decisions (TRO), technology companies will be saddled with new and unpredictable operational risks that could destabilise their business planning for years.

    A new front in Big Tech’s relationship with government

    The case sheds light on a broader issue: the tension between the pace of innovation and the rigours of national security. The DOD’s decision to blacklist Anthropic is all the more surprising given that the startup promotes itself as a leader in AI security and ethics. Microsoft’s vote, backed by engineers from OpenAI and Google, suggests that the industry resents arbitrary decisions by officials that could block the military’s access to cutting-edge tools.

    The dispute shows that in the AI sector, technical success is only half the battle; the other is navigating the increasingly complex maze of government regulation. If the court does not grant Anthropic and Microsoft’s request, this precedent could hit any software vendor working with the public sector.

     

  • Claude on the US blacklist. Anthropic goes to court against the Pentagon

    Claude on the US blacklist. Anthropic goes to court against the Pentagon

    Anthropic, the artificial intelligence lab positioning itself as a ‘secure’ alternative to the giants, has gone on an unprecedented legal offensive against the federal government. Lawsuits filed in California and the District of Columbia seek to block the Pentagon’s decision to blacklist the company from national security. This clash is not just a dispute over arms contracts; it is a fundamental test of who ultimately controls the ‘brains’ of artificial intelligence – Silicon Valley or Washington.

    The conflict escalated when Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth imposed a supply chain risk designation on Anthropic. The reason was the refusal of Dario Amodei, Anthropic’s CEO, to remove ethical ‘barriers’ restricting the use of Claude in autonomous weapons systems and for domestic surveillance. The Pentagon’s position is that the law, not private corporations, decides how the country is defended and demands full flexibility in military operations. Anthropic, on the other hand, argues that current technology is too unreliable to be entrusted with life-and-death decisions, and that forcing its use violates free speech and due process.

    This battle has immediate consequences. Although Amodei reassures that the restrictions are narrow in scope, the market uncertainty is apparent. The presidential order to halt Claude’s use across government hits the company’s image as a stable partner. As Wedbush’s Dan Ives notes, the corporate sector may temporarily ‘put its pencils down’ on new Anthropic technology deployments while waiting for legal clarity.

    While Anthropic is fighting in the courts, the competition is wasting no time. OpenAI was quick to declare its principles convergent with the needs of the Department of Defence, taking the lead in dealing with the government. However, solidarity with Anthropic was expressed by researchers from Google and OpenAI, warning in an amicus curiae opinion that punishing companies for caring about security would stifle innovation and silence critical debate in the industry. The outcome of this trial will determine the new architecture of the relationship between the state and AI developers, defining whether the ethics of the model can be negotiated with the government.

  • Trump excludes Anthropic from contracts. New AI rules in the US

    Trump excludes Anthropic from contracts. New AI rules in the US

    There has been a sharp cooling in the relationship between Silicon Valley and the Pentagon that could redefine the business model of leading artificial intelligence labs. The Trump administration, seeking full operational freedom in the use of new technologies, is putting in place strict guidelines that call into question the autonomy of companies such as Anthropic.

    The General Services Administration’s decision to terminate contracts with Anthropic and label the company a ‘supply chain risk’ signals that the government will not tolerate compromises on control of AI tools. The flashpoint appeared to be the security mechanisms built into the models, which the Department of Defence believes cripple their military and civilian utility.

    A key element of the new strategy is the requirement to grant the US government an irrevocable licence to use AI systems for “any lawful purpose”. The new GSA guidelines go further, striking at the very structure of algorithms. Companies seeking federal contracts cannot “intentionally encode ideological judgements” into the results generated by the systems. This is a direct blow to content filtering mechanisms, which the administration sees as a form of censorship or bias.

    The current situation creates a clear division in the market. Companies that opt for the full flexibility and ‘neutrality’ required by Washington will gain privileged access to the public sector. Others, emphasising restrictive security barriers, may be pushed out of the world’s most important procurement market, drastically altering their valuations and growth prospects.

  • AI chips for investment in the US. Trump’s administration is changing the rules

    AI chips for investment in the US. Trump’s administration is changing the rules

    Washington is preparing to fundamentally redefine the rules of the global artificial intelligence arms race. According to documents, Donald Trump’ s administration is considering a new restrictive export framework for the most advanced AI systems. Instead of the previous policy based primarily on national security, the new model shifts the centre of gravity towards tough business negotiations and a requirement for direct investment within the US.

    The proposed legislation stipulates that access to large batches of processors – in excess of 200,000 units – will be conditional not only on security guarantees, but primarily on capital commitment to US infrastructure. This is a radical departure from the previous administration’s approach, which rewarded close allies with broad exemptions from export controls. The current vision is more transactional: you want to build AI power at home, you must first help build it in America.

    The control mechanism is to be multi-level and extremely precise. The documents suggest that even relatively small installations of less than a thousand chips may require special licences. Crucially, the burden of oversight is to fall directly on manufacturers such as Nvidia and AMD. These companies would be required to monitor how the hardware is used, and recipients would have to implement software to prevent processors from combining into massive computing clusters without Washington’s explicit approval.

    The model for the new regulations is to be the agreements recently concluded with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Department of Commerce, cutting out the – what it called – ‘onerous’ rules of its predecessors, is betting on a model in which technology transfer is a reward for economic loyalty. For global technology players, this means they need to review their data centre location strategies.

    While the new rules do not directly hit fully embargoed countries like Russia, they cast a shadow over relations with existing partners in Europe and Asia. Washington is gaining powerful leverage: AI chips are becoming the most important currency in economic diplomacy. Companies hoping to maintain their growth momentum must now factor in the cost of investing in the US, which will become a kind of ‘ticket of entry’ to the world’s most advanced silicon architecture.

  • Control Architecture: How NIS2 and Data Act regulations have redefined cloud maturity in 2026

    Control Architecture: How NIS2 and Data Act regulations have redefined cloud maturity in 2026

    The fascination with cloud computing technology itself has given way to an era of mature risk management. Until a few years ago, debates in IT directors’ offices oscillated around the dichotomy between on-premises and public infrastructure, treating migration as an end in itself. The year 2026, however, brought a sobering and profound redefinition of priorities. Today, the cloud has ceased to be merely a moving infrastructure and has become a strategic ecosystem in which control is the key currency. Indeed, the real challenge is no longer a question of where a container or virtual machine physically resides, but who is actually in control of cost, operational continuity, legal compliance and the ability to change course when market dynamics demand it.

    The business landscape has been shaped by two powerful regulatory pillars: the NIS2 Directive and the EU Data Act, which took full effect on 12 September 2025. Although initially treated with some reserve, typical of new bureaucratic burdens, in retrospect they appear as catalysts for positive change. They have transformed the European digital services market from a space dominated by the arbitrary rules of global providers to an environment where transparency and interoperability have become a standard rather than a privilege.

    Fundamental to this change is the shift from declarative security to operational resilience. For years, many organisations have relied on so-called catalogue security, trusting that the certifications of the big players automatically solve the problem of protecting assets. The implementation of NIS2 has brutally verified this approach, imposing a common framework that requires real risk management measures and precise incident reporting mechanisms. In 2026, security is seen as a continuous process of monitoring, detecting and actively learning from mistakes. The difference between having control and being protected has become clear: the former requires the ability to demonstrate at any time what happened, what steps were taken and how the failure was mitigated.

    In parallel, the Data Act has introduced a new dynamic in the relationship between the customer and the processing provider. A key element of this regulation is the facilitation of migration between providers, effectively hitting the phenomenon of dependence on a single technical partner. Minimum requirements for cloud contracts and imposed interoperability standards have meant that the concept of exit readiness is no longer just a theoretical provision in business continuity plans. In practice, this means that organisations can today plan their architecture in a modular manner, without fear of economic or technological barriers to a possible change of provider. The ability to seamlessly transfer data and functionality without losing its integrity has become the insurance policy of the modern business.

    Nowadays, there is a clear trend for medium and large companies to seek more customised models. Increasingly, the choice is falling on hybrid environments or private models hosted within established cloud providers. This structure preserves the benefits of consuming resources as a service, while offering a higher level of isolation, traceability and, most importantly, operational proximity. In this context, the naming of solutions goes down the drain. It becomes irrelevant whether the model is labelled public or private, as long as it measurably addresses the fundamental needs of the business.

    Three questions are key here, which in 2026 represent a kind of litmus test for any cloud strategy. The first relates to operational peace of mind: does the architecture allow for stable operations without worrying about sudden regulatory or technological changes? The second relates to auditability: is the compliance verification process frictionless, evidence-based and naturally collaborative with the provider, rather than tediously mining data from opaque systems? The third, and perhaps most important, relates to freedom: does the organisation have a viable and feasible exit route if the partnership ceases to meet expectations?

    True business resilience is no longer equated with a simple high availability parameter written into a contract. Mature organisations understand that business continuity does not come from a blanket provision of guaranteed uptime, but from sound design, application-level replication and regularly tested disaster recovery plans. With this approach, businesses stop improvising with each new project, relying instead on repeatable mechanisms and clear recovery objectives. This shift from reactive firefighting to predictable crisis management is one of the biggest successes forced by the new framework.

    The human factor is also not insignificant. The most valuable attribute of a cloud provider turns out to be a stable team that understands the specifics of a particular business, its critical moments and periods of peak demand. The best cloud is not the one that offers the most elaborate management console, but the one that realistically takes the operational burden off the customer’s shoulders. Team continuity on the part of the technology partner is often the only difference between a chaotic response to an incident and a controlled process of system evolution.

    The issue of upgrading applications is also worth noting. The cloud loses its economic efficiency when it is treated merely as expensive hosting for outdated solutions. Excessive resource consumption and the need to manually handle legacy workloads generate layers of exceptions that, over time, become a brake on innovation. True productivity is born out of a step-by-step upgrade towards cloud-native patterns, where automation, scalability and observability are built into the very design of the system. A hybrid model, skilfully designed, allows you to draw the best of both worlds: to benefit from the advanced analytics services or artificial intelligence of global players, while maintaining the core of your business in a secure, sovereign and fully controlled environment.

    The migration process is no longer seen as simply copying machines. It requires precise planning, coordination with the business and the redesign of security policies from day one. When the supplier takes full responsibility for the process, operational risk drops dramatically and deployment timelines become predictable. This is a key element in building a competitive advantage, especially in industries subject to strong regulatory rigour.

    The year 2026 is when cloud maturity is measured not by the number of services available, but by the quality of control over them. European regulations such as NIS2 and the Data Act, while demanding, have laid a solid foundation for a system where security, sovereignty and portability are immanent features of digital services. Businesses that have understood this lesson no longer see the cloud as an expense, but as a platform for growth, providing traceability, proven continuity and, above all, the peace of mind necessary to make bold decisions in a global marketplace. In this new dispensation, the winners are those for whom technology is a servant of strategy, not a constraint on it.

  • Big Tech workers vs Pentagon. Military pressure on AI sector sparks resistance

    Big Tech workers vs Pentagon. Military pressure on AI sector sparks resistance

    When US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth called the development of artificial intelligence a military arms race in January, relations between the government and Silicon Valley entered a new and turbulent phase. We are now witnessing unprecedented pressure from the US administration on key players in the AI sector, which is being met with increasing resistance from the developers of these technologies themselves.

    A growing conflict has been sparked by an ultimatum issued to Anthropic. The Pentagon is reportedly threatening to use the Defence Production Act to force the company to adapt its language models to the needs of the US military. A refusal would result in the company being deemed a supply chain risk. In response to this pressure, Anthropic has made it clear that it will not make its solutions available for mass surveillance of citizens or to power weapons capable of autonomous killing without close human oversight.

    The situation instantly triggered a wave of solidarity within the competing companies. A group of vetted Google and OpenAI employees have signed a joint petition entitled ‘We will not be divided’. The signatories of the document warn that the Department of Defence is attempting to use classic divisive tactics, hoping to force the tech giants to make concessions that AI security leaders have not agreed to. The initiative aims to create a united industry front. Employees are calling on their companies’ boards to maintain standards and not hand over technology to the military without proper ethical safeguards.

    From a business perspective, the threat of using extraordinary national security powers against private technology entities is an entry into completely uncharted territory. As Dean Ball, former White House technology policy advisor, notes, Anthropic faces the dangerous spectre of quasi-nationalisation or exclusion from the market. This aggressive move by the administration also sends a clear and worrying message to the entire innovation ecosystem, suggesting that doing business with the government carries a huge risk of losing operational independence.

    These developments will define not only the future of weapons contracts in Silicon Valley, but above all the limits of commercialisation and control of the most powerful models of artificial intelligence.

  • Online advertising market under scrutiny. The Belgian authority is checking Google

    Online advertising market under scrutiny. The Belgian authority is checking Google

    Alphabet, Google’s parent company, is facing another regulatory challenge in Europe. This time, the company’s key driving engine, online ad sales, has been targeted. The Belgian competition watchdog has announced that it has opened an investigation, pointing to serious indications suggesting an abuse of market power by the tech giant. Although the case is at an early stage, it sheds light on the growing pressure on a business model that has dominated the digital ecosystem for years.

    From a business perspective, the online ad market is a complex web of tools connecting advertisers to publishers. Google has a strong position at almost every stage of this chain. Belgian officials are investigating whether the current model violates antitrust rules and restricts the free market. Possible regulatory interventions could affect the distribution of advertising revenues and force greater transparency throughout the auction process.

    The situation in Belgium is not an isolated case, but rather part of a wider European puzzle. Mountain View has been repeatedly targeted by EU regulators, resulting in multi-billion dollar fines in recent years. Moreover, the spectre of another European Commission investigation looms on the horizon. According to the company’s recent communication to advertisers, Brussels is looking into concerns about potential unfair overpricing of advertising space.

    The technology company has consistently defended its operating model in an effort to tone down sentiment. Google representatives argue that their advertising systems are the foundations that level the playing field, allowing small and medium-sized businesses to compete effectively with the largest global brands. In addition, they emphasise a key argument for consumers themselves – it is the profits from advertising that allow them to maintain free access to most resources on the web.

    The outcome of the Belgian investigation remains unclear, but it is a clear sign to the industry that the architecture of the AdTech market will be subject to increasingly stringent audits. Companies basing their growth strategies on search engine campaigns should keep a close eye on the actions of European regulators, as they may ultimately remodel the costs and rules under which user attention is bought online.

  • Nvidia H200 in China: Why are AI processor exports still stagnant?

    Nvidia H200 in China: Why are AI processor exports still stagnant?

    Behind the scenes in US technology politics, one of the riskiest deals in semiconductor history is currently underway. Although President Trump’s administration has formally opened the door for sales of Nvidia H200 processors to China, the reality on the trade front remains static. David Peters, assistant secretary for export enforcement, confirmed to the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee that so far not a single H200 unit has legally reached Chinese customers.

    The situation sheds light on the White House’s new pragmatic strategy, championed by ‘AI czar’ David Sacks. The logic behind the conditional release of H200 chips is simple, if controversial: flooding the Chinese market with US technology is intended to dampen the incentive for giants there, such as Huawei, to invest billions in developing proprietary architectures. The theory is that China’s dependence on the Nvidia and AMD ecosystem will more effectively delay Beijing’s emergence as an independent technology powerhouse than total isolation, which forces competitors to innovate under siege.

    However, this vision is meeting strong resistance from ‘hawks’ in Congress. Critics fear that the barriers separating the commercial and military sectors are illusory and that advanced systems could quickly be diverted to military purposes. The atmosphere has been thickened by reports of the success of Chinese startup DeepSeek, which according to reports has managed to train its models using Nvidia’s most powerful chips, circumventing existing restrictions.

    David Peters admitted outright that chip smuggling is a reality and is now a priority for law enforcement. For investors and business leaders, the message is clear: despite formal approvals, the H200 route to China is riddled with bureaucratic ‘fuses’ that, for now, effectively block the real flow of goods. Nvidia finds itself caught between the pressure to maximise revenue from a key market and the rigorous oversight of the Department of Commerce, which subjects every transaction to meticulous scrutiny.

  • The end of cheap power for AI? Trump hits back at tech giants

    The end of cheap power for AI? Trump hits back at tech giants

    The Trump administration has thrown down the gauntlet to technology giants, confronting them with a dilemma that could redefine the economics of data centres in the US. During his State of the Union address, the president announced that major technology companies would be forced to build their own power supplies to relieve the strain on the national electricity grid. While the rhetoric focuses on protecting consumers’ wallets from rising bills, for the AI and cloud computing sector this marks a shift from a pure consumption model to a role as critical infrastructure developers.

    The move is a direct response to tensions in states such as Virginia and Ohio, where the rapid growth of AI clusters has led to an overloading of local grids. PJM Interconnection, a key operator on the East Coast, has previously suggested that new large-scale energy customers need to bring their own capacity into the system. Now these suggestions are becoming the foundation of hard federal policy.

    For leaders such as Microsoft, Google and Amazon, the announced March meeting at the White House will not just be a courtesy visit. These companies have been investing in renewables for years, but Trump’s new doctrine suggests something much more demanding: physical separation from the public grid or direct financing of new energy generation (so-called *behind-the-meter*). This forces capital-intensive investment, probably towards small modular reactors (SMRs) or advanced energy storage systems, which are currently in the early stages of deployment.

    From a business perspective, Trump is trying to kill two birds with one stone. On the one hand, the administration wants to maintain its lead over China in the AI arms race, which requires gigantic computing power. On the other hand, rising energy prices have become a political burden ahead of the upcoming mid-term elections. By shifting the cost of infrastructure development to Big Tech, the White House is taking this burden off the shoulders of voters, while forcing companies to accelerate innovation in the energy sector.

  • Pavel Durov accused of terrorism: Russia hits Telegram

    Pavel Durov accused of terrorism: Russia hits Telegram

    For Pavel Durov, balancing on the edge between freedom of speech and the demands of state security is not new, but Moscow’s latest offensive takes the game to an existential level. The Federal Security Service (FSB) has officially opened an investigation against Telegram‘s founder, charging him under Article 205.1 of the Russian Criminal Code – ‘facilitating terrorist activity’. This strikes at the very heart of a platform that has become synonymous with privacy for its more than one billion users and an out of control tool for Russia.

    This escalation has a deeply strategic dimension. Russia, traditionally accusing Telegram of being a tool of Western services, is now hitting the platform from a ‘guardian of order’ position. In the background, however, there is a clear business and political objective: to push users towards MAX, a state-run alternative that aims to replace Telegram in the everyday communications of Russians. For the Kremlin, Telegram has ceased to be a useful information distribution channel and has become too risky a loophole in the system of digital sovereignty.

    From a business perspective, Durov’s situation is becoming complicated. On the one hand, Telegram rejects accusations of being a haven for crime; on the other, it has to face increasingly strong restrictions imposed by the state communications regulator. Companies operating in the region or using the app for operational purposes must now weigh the risks: will a platform that has become the target of such heavy criminal charges maintain its stability and independence?

    History is coming full circle. Durov, who left Russia years ago after a dispute over control of the VKontakte service, is once again facing a dilemma that will define the future of his empire. If Moscow manages to successfully block access or discredit the app in the eyes of the mass public, Telegram could lose one of its key markets. But for a global investor, it signals that Telegram remains the last bastion whose takeover requires the state to use the heaviest legal calibre. The question is whether, in a world of increasing regulatory pressure, Durov’s ‘neutrality’ is still a viable business model.

  • DeepSeek has broken the embargo: Chinese AI trained on Nvidia Blackwell

    DeepSeek has broken the embargo: Chinese AI trained on Nvidia Blackwell

    A senior Trump administration official confirmed on Monday that the latest model of artificial intelligence from Chinese startup DeepSeek had been trained using Nvidia Blackwell processors. The information caused a stir in Washington, as Blackwell is currently the world’s most advanced AI chip, the export of which to China is strictly prohibited by US law.

    According to US government findings, the computing infrastructure used by DeepSeek is located in a data centre in Inner Mongolia. Officials speculate that the startup will attempt to remove technical signatures from the upcoming model to hide the fact that US chips were being used. While the administration refuses to disclose the source of this information and the route the processors took to China, the incident highlights the leakiness of current technological barriers.

    The situation exacerbates an ongoing dispute in Washington over strategy towards China’s AI sector. On the one hand, AI advisor David Sacks and Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang argue that allowing the sale of older or intentionally weakened units (like the H200) discourages Chinese companies from building their own alternatives. On the other hand, ‘hawks’ in the administration warn that the commercial success of startups such as DeepSeek directly supports Chinese military capabilities.

    Headquartered in Hangzhou, DeepSeek has already gained notoriety for creating models that rival leading Silicon Valley products at significantly lower operating costs. However, current accusations suggest that this success may be based not only on engineering, but also on so-called model distillation – a technique that involves training its own systems on results generated by OpenAI, Google or Anthropic models.

  • Digital realism on NATO’s border: Poland formalizes cybersecurity requirements

    Digital realism on NATO’s border: Poland formalizes cybersecurity requirements

    President Karol Nawrocki’s signing of the amendment to the National CyberSecurity System (KSC) Act marks the moment when theoretical considerations about state resilience give way to hard legislative reality. This signals a fundamental reorientation of strategy in Polish companies, where cyber security is becoming an integral part of corporate governance. At the same time, the parallel referral of high-risk vendor regulations to the Constitutional Court introduces an element of strategic dualism that requires business leaders to be not only technologically proficient but also legally sophisticated.

    Fundamental to the new regulation is the belief that digital security cannot have party colours. The implementation of the NIS2 Directive and the Toolbox 5G assumptions brings the Polish IT ecosystem into a framework of strict discipline, extending the protective umbrella to sectors that have hitherto operated outside the mainstream of digital surveillance. Food production, water and sewage management or postal services are becoming full participants in the system, which, from a business perspective, means that supply chains and incident management procedures need to be reviewed immediately.

    The most intriguing aspect of the current situation, however, is the decision-making dualism that has taken place in the Presidential Palace. The signing of the bill while at the same time challenging the High Risk Vendor (HRV) legislation creates a state of limbo that can seem paralysing to many organisations. This mechanism, often referred to as a market sieve, is designed to weed out entities from key infrastructure that may pose a threat to state interests. However, presidential concerns about interference with business freedom and the lack of compensation mechanisms for the forced dismantling of facilities provide an important fuse for the market. While the direction of change is irrevocable, the final shape of infrastructure transformation costs may yet evolve.

    From an operational perspective, the key challenge becomes the seven-year timeframe provided for phasing out solutions from vendors deemed risky. On the scale of the IT lifecycle, seven years seems like an eternity, but in the context of planning multi-million dollar investments in critical infrastructure, the clock has started ticking at a high volume. Companies are faced with a dilemma: whether to continue working with existing partners, hoping for a favourable Constitutional Court ruling, or to preemptively make a turn towards suppliers with a lower political risk profile. A wait-and-see strategy, although tempting from the perspective of short-term cost optimisation, may prove risky in view of the severe penalties foreseen for non-compliance with the orders of the supervisory authorities.

    It is worth noting that the KSC amendment introduces a new definition of responsibility for information security. Shifting the burden of decision-making onto the shoulders of unit managers and board members is a paradigm shift that ends the era of delegating digital risk solely to IT directors. The possibility of imposing personal liability, including financial and criminal sanctions, makes cyber security a permanent agenda item at company board meetings.

    Expanding the competences of bodies such as the Minister of Digitalisation, the Financial Supervision Authority or the President of UKE, equips the state with instruments of active control. The ability to issue binding warnings, appoint monitoring officers or order audits at the entrepreneur’s expense, creates a new landscape of business-state relations. In this set-up, the S46 system and the newly established sectoral CSIRTs are intended to act as centres of support and knowledge exchange, which should in theory increase the overall resilience of the market. However, for businesses, this also implies the need to build internal structures capable of working seamlessly with these bodies on a near real-time basis.

    The financial dimension of the new regulation is merciless. Penalties amounting to millions of euros or a percentage of global revenues are intended to act as a deterrent, but they also pose a real risk to the liquidity of entities that disregard the new obligations. Daily penalties for late compliance with protective orders can be particularly severe. In this context, investments in cyber security should today be interpreted as an insurance policy for continued market presence.

    Summarising the current status, it should be emphasised that the signature of the KSC amendment definitively closes the time of discussion on the legitimacy of tightening digital rigour. The Polish economy is entering a phase of technological maturity, where trust in IT systems is as important as the stability of the currency or the transparency of tax law. While the referral of HRV regulations for follow-up scrutiny introduces a degree of uncertainty, it should not dull the vigilance of business leaders. True organisational resilience is not born in the courtroom, but in the process of diligently identifying vulnerabilities and building a security culture that goes beyond the minimum statutory requirements.

    The current situation requires business to adopt an attitude of cyber-realism. It involves accepting that technology today is inextricably linked to geopolitics and that IT purchasing decisions are strategic state choices.

    For the IT market, on the other hand, the amendment represents a powerful modernisation impulse, shifting the centre of gravity from the simple sale of technical solutions towards comprehensive strategic consultancy and advanced risk management. The sector is faced with the need to redefine existing cooperation models, in which the criterion of price is finally giving way to security approvals and full transparency of the supply chain. At the same time, the continuing uncertainty around the status of high-risk providers may paradoxically dynamise the segment of cloud services and hybrid solutions, seen as a safer alternative to rigid, physical infrastructure, whose future remains hostage to tribunal settlements. In the longer term, the bill’s signature cements the position of specialised integrators as key architects of business resilience.

  • Texas is suing TP-Link: Allegations of links to China

    Texas is suing TP-Link: Allegations of links to China

    The line between civilian infrastructure and national security is becoming ever thinner. The latest evidence of this is the lawsuit brought by Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton against TP-Link Systems. This litigation, although taking place in a courtroom, strikes at the foundations of trust in global supply chains for network equipment used by millions of households and businesses.

    The main axis of the accusation centres on allegedly misleading consumers about the origin and safety of the products. Texas claims that, despite TP-Link’s Californian headquarters, almost all of the devices’ components come from China, supposedly opening the door to Beijing-controlled operations. Paxton goes a step further, suggesting that the devices have already been used as tools in cyber attacks on the US.

    However, TP-Link is not about to back down, announcing that it will defend its reputation. The company’s strategy is based on a hard operational separation from its Chinese roots. The manufacturer’s representatives emphasise that critical infrastructure and US user data are stored on Amazon Web Services servers in the US, and that the Chinese government has no control over the company. The data localisation argument is becoming the strongest bargaining chip in the hands of global technology players.

    The TP-Link case is not an isolated incident, but part of a wider puzzle. Texas has already banned its officials from using the brand’s devices, and Paxton’s actions are part of a wider trend of policies towards China that the administration in Washington is also promoting. Significantly, the lawsuit comes at a time when federal attempts to block sales of the company’s products have been halted.

  • The end of Starlinks in Russia? Official confirmation of terminal blockade

    The end of Starlinks in Russia? Official confirmation of terminal blockade

    Recent reports from the frontline in Ukraine show how SpaceX is managing access to its Starlink network in contested zones and how armies are adapting to the sudden loss of satellite communications.

    Russia’s deputy defence minister, Alexei Krivorukhko, has publicly acknowledged that Starlink terminals used by Russian units stopped working about a fortnight ago. This confirmation follows a series of announcements from the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation suggesting that mechanisms to block unauthorised devices have been effectively implemented. It’s a delicate credibility game for SpaceX – the company has to balance global commercial expansion with strict US Department of Defense requirements for export controls and allied support.

    From a business and technological perspective, however, the most interesting aspect is the impact of the blockade on operational effectiveness. Although the Ukrainian side reports significant impediments to Russian logistics and command, Moscow maintains that the intensity of unmanned attacks has not decreased. This suggests a progressive diversification of Russian communications systems. While Starlink offers unrivalled bandwidth and low latency, modern long-range drones are increasingly using hybrid guidance systems that include indigenous satellites, inertial navigation and – most worryingly for Western observers – integrated systems based on artificial intelligence that make the machine independent of a fixed connection to an operator.

    Relying on a single, external broadband provider is a risk that professional armies seek to avoid. The incident shows that ‘geofencing’ (blocking services in a specific area) is an effective political tool, but in a clash with a determined adversary it can only be a temporary obstacle.

  • New space law in Poland opens new chapter for VC and deep tech

    New space law in Poland opens new chapter for VC and deep tech

    For years, the Polish space sector functioned in a kind of regulatory vacuum. Although indigenous companies successfully provided instruments for ESA or NASA missions, there was a lack of a national legal framework to define the rules of the game in orbit. The Act on Space Activities adopted by the Sejm on 13 February changes this state of affairs, transforming Poland from an ambitious observer into a fully-fledged player on the map of the global extraterrestrial economy.

    For investors and entrepreneurs, the most important signal coming from Warsaw is predictability. The law introduces a clear definition of space activities, encompassing launch, exploitation and – crucially in an era of the growing problem of space junk – deorbit of objects. This approach encapsulates the life cycle of a mission in a legal framework, which is essential for obtaining debt financing or commercial insurance.

    Unlike many European counterparts, the Polish regulation relies on flexibility. The abandonment of rigid capital thresholds in favour of assessing the risk of a specific mission is a nod to the NewSpace sector. Instead of blocking young spin-off companies from entering the market with prohibitive financial requirements, the President of the Polish Space Agency (POLSA) will assess the entity’s real operational capabilities.

    Equally important is the issue of civil liability. The law limits the maximum sum insured to €60 million, which is a reasonable amount on the scale of the global space industry. This protects smaller players from costs that could stifle innovation at the prototyping stage. In addition, limiting the liability of subcontractors to wilful misconduct only builds a safe ecosystem for a wide supply chain – from sensor manufacturers to software providers.

    The National Register of Space Objects (NROK) is becoming a key oversight tool. Registering an object under the Polish flag means bringing it under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Poland, which, from an international perspective, brings order to issues of ownership and state responsibility. At the same time, POLSA is emerging as a central administrator of satellite data, which is expected to stimulate the market for downstream applications – using data from orbit in agriculture, logistics or insurance.

    The Polish law is not just a formality, but a strategic foundation. By creating a stable legal environment, Warsaw is sending a clear message to VC funds: Polish deep tech is ready to scale beyond the atmosphere, and legal risk is no longer a barrier to entry.

  • AI model Claude used in operation to capture Nicolás Maduro

    AI model Claude used in operation to capture Nicolás Maduro

    As reported by the Wall Street Journal, the language model Claude from Anthropic played a key role in the operation to capture former Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro. This event marks a turning point not only for diplomacy, but above all for the AI sector, which has so far shied away from direct involvement in kinetic operations.

    The success of the operation, which ended with Maduro being transported to New York on drug trafficking charges, relied on a technological triangle: the computing power of Anthropic, the Palantir data integration platform and the US Department of Defence infrastructure. This partnership with Palantir proved to be a kind of ‘Trojan horse’ for Anthropic, allowing it to have a presence in top-secret networks to which access for civilian AI giants had hitherto been limited.

    For Silicon Valley, this issue is extremely uncomfortable. Anthropic, now valued at a staggering $380 billion, has built its image as a ‘secure and ethical’ company. Their official usage policy categorically prohibits the use of Claude to support violence or surveillance. However, the model’s presence in the Pentagon’s classified systems suggests that these rules become flexible when national security interests are at stake.

    The Pentagon has been putting pressure on market leaders such as OpenAI and Anthropic for months, demanding the removal of security roadblocks in tools provided to the military. The military argues that standard restrictions that protect the average user from generating harmful content become a hindrance in a wartime environment.

    From a business perspective, Anthropic’s marriage with the military-industrial complex is a signal to investors that the biggest profits from AI may lie in government contracts, even at the expense of image consistency. While competitors still operate mainly in unclassified networks, Anthropic – thanks to the intermediation of third parties – has gained a strategic advantage.

  • The end of the dream of digital Europe? Capgemini opts for pragmatism instead of sovereignty

    The end of the dream of digital Europe? Capgemini opts for pragmatism instead of sovereignty

    Aiman Ezzat, CEO of Capgemini, has publicly rejected the idea of complete technological autonomy for the Old Continent, calling it unrealistic. Although the head of the French IT giant dresses it up as pragmatism, for many business and political leaders his words are an admission of an enduring dependence on Silicon Valley.

    Positioning itself as a ‘bridge’ between Brussels and the US hyperscalers, Capgemini is promoting a model in which European companies manage data and operations, but outsource the computing itself to AWS, Google or Microsoft infrastructure. This approach, while convenient in the short term, raises fundamental questions about the security and competitiveness of the region in the long term.

    Dependency architecture

    Ezzat divides sovereignty into four layers: data, operations, regulation and technology. He argues that control over the first three is enough for Europe to feel secure. However, it is the fourth layer – pure computing power and hardware – that is the foundation of the AI economy.

    Leaving this layer in the hands of US giants means that European companies build their most innovative solutions on ‘rented ground’. In the face of transatlantic and volatile US trade policy, such a model makes Europe hostage to decisions made in Seattle or Mountain View. “Sovereign AI solutions” offered by Capgemini may turn out to be merely an aesthetic overlay on systems over which Europe has no real technical control.

    Between ethics and profit

    Critics reproach Capgemini for their vision of sovereignty being tailored to current contracts rather than the strategic interests of the region. The company itself is struggling with image problems – the recent decision to sell its US arm handling government contracts shows how difficult it is to reconcile the role of ‘independent advisor’ with aggressive expansion in the US market.

    Partnerships with local players, such as Mistral AI, are presented as evidence of supporting the European ecosystem. However, as long as these models are trained and hosted on Microsoft servers, talk of a ‘European champion’ remains a mere marketing ploy. The lesson from Ezzat’s speech is a cautionary tale: accepting ‘bridging solutions’ can mean permanently giving up on building our own capabilities.

  • US and China out of pact on military AI. Europe is left alone with regulations

    US and China out of pact on military AI. Europe is left alone with regulations

    While Silicon Valley is racing to become a leader in language models, a much riskier game is underway on the military technology front. The REAIM summit in A Coruña, Spain, aimed at developing standards for the responsible deployment of artificial intelligence in the military, ended in a telling stalemate. Only a third of the participating countries chose to sign a declaration of principles, with the biggest players, the US and China, among the absentees.

    For defence and technology executives, the message is clear: despite the rhetoric about security, battlefield pragmatism is winning out over diplomacy. Only 35 out of 85 countries have endorsed the set of 20 principles, which include the need for human oversight of autonomous weapons and transparency in chains of command. Although European powers and South Korea have become signatories, the lack of support from Washington and Beijing reduces these arrangements to the role of theoretical postulates.

    Dutch Defence Minister Ruben Brekelmans aptly diagnosed the situation as a classic ‘prisoner’s dilemma’. States face a choice: impose ethical constraints on themselves at the risk of falling behind adversaries, or continue to develop unchecked for fear of losing strategic advantage. The rapid progress of Russia and China in autonomising their combat systems is building up pressure that makes even democratic allies hesitant to formalise any barriers.

    The current political climate adds another layer of uncertainty. US-European tensions and the unpredictability of the future transatlantic relationship meant that delegates approached binding declarations with great reserve. Even if this year’s document did not have the force of law, the very attempt to outline a concrete policy proved too bold for those who see AI as a decisive asset in the coming decade.

    From a business perspective, the lack of global consensus means that the defence AI market will remain the ‘Wild West’. Technology companies developing systems for the military must navigate a regulatory vacuum where ethical standards are shaped by individual government contracts rather than international law. Until the major players recognise that the risks of unintended escalation outweigh the benefits of technological dominance, a united front on military AI will remain only an ambitious project on paper.

  • Brussels loosens its grip: Apple Maps and Ads off the DMA radar

    Brussels loosens its grip: Apple Maps and Ads off the DMA radar

    The European Commission’s decision to exempt Apple Maps and Apple Ads from the restrictive Digital Markets Act (DMA) framework is a rare but significant victory for the Cupertino giant in its clash with EU bureaucracy. While Apple as a corporation remains under strict scrutiny, these particular services have escaped the ‘access gatekeeper’ label, which effectively means not having to open up their ecosystems to external competition.

    Brussels acknowledged Apple’s argument, pointing to the relatively low market shares of both platforms in Europe. In a world dominated by Google Maps and the powerful ad networks of Meta or Google, Apple’s offering is not a critical ‘gateway’ connecting business to the end customer. For business strategists, this signals the EU’s ability to remain flexible and not impose flat-rate regulation on every Big Tech service.

    This ruling allows Apple to retain full control over the user experience within the navigation and internal advertising of the App Store. At the same time, it underscores the Commission’s pragmatism: regulation is intended to strike where monopoly stifles innovation, not where the giant is still struggling to establish itself as a contender.

  • Spain bans social media for young people. Is this the beginning of the end of the ‘Wild West’ era in the EU?

    Spain bans social media for young people. Is this the beginning of the end of the ‘Wild West’ era in the EU?

    Spain is becoming the latest battleground in the growing conflict between European nation states and tech giants. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, declaring that ‘democracy will not bow to the oligarchs of the algorithm’, has announced a radically tougher course towards social media platforms. The proposed legislation, which includes banning under-16s from social media and holding executives accountable for hate speech, puts Spain in the vanguard of digital protectionism.

    Madrid’s move is more than local regulation; it is a signal to markets that the business model based on unrestricted access to young demographics is in question. Australia has already taken similar steps, and France and the UK are intensively studying analogous scenarios. For investors and technology leaders, this means redefining growth strategies in Europe, where regulatory risk is becoming a key operating cost.

    The response from the technology sector was immediate and remarkably direct. Elon Musk referred to Sánchez as a ‘tyrant’ and Pavel Durov, founder of Telegram, used his platform to directly warn millions of Spanish users. According to Durov, the new law will force companies to collect sensitive data en masse and allow governments to control content arbitrarily. This direct communication of platforms with citizens, bypassing traditional diplomatic channels, is evidence for the government of the “urgent need to regulate” tools that can be used for mass disinformation.

    A key element of the Spanish strategy is an attempt to end online anonymity by linking user profiles to the European Digital Identity Wallet (EUDI Wallet). If this model is implemented, Spain could set a precedent that will permanently change the architecture of the internet in the EU – from a pseudonymous space to a closely monitored ecosystem. For technology companies, this means the end of the ‘laissez-faire’ era and the need to build costly age verification and content moderation systems that will have to meet the strict requirements of local law. What is at stake in this clash is not just coverage, but the foundations of the relationship between the state and private digital capital.

  • Sovereignty or a bottomless pit? Government, Microsoft and billions for licences

    Sovereignty or a bottomless pit? Government, Microsoft and billions for licences

    In February 2026, the Polish debate on digitalisation entered a new, hot phase. The Central Informatics Centre (COI) announced an ambitious plan: to build a national office suite for public administration to replace the Redmond giant’s solutions. This move is part of the broader European trend of ‘digital sovereignty’, but the Polish version raises as much hope as justified scepticism. For business and IT leaders, it is a signal that the hitherto “licence first” model is no longer the only path to state development. But is Poland ready for its own ‘Office’, or are we in for another billion-dollar project of dubious quality?

    The dictate of one supplier: Diagnosing the monopoly

    The starting point for the COI initiative was the Instrat Foundation report ‘Seemingly open procurement’, published at the end of 2025. The data are merciless: as much as 99% of the analysed public procurement of office software in Poland directly or indirectly favours Microsoft products. In one in five tenders, competitors are excluded outright, and in the rest, through specific technical requirements that only one ecosystem meets.

    The vendor lock-in phenomenon has ceased to be a theoretical academic problem and has become a real threat to government budgets. As licence costs rise, the administration has nowhere to run, because the entire infrastructure, from mail to advanced spreadsheets, is based on closed standards. The head of the COI, Radosław Maćkiewicz, makes it clear: Poland spends too much money on Microsoft software, and these funds could support an indigenous IT ecosystem.

    The other side of the coin: The spectre of “billionaire systems”

    When the administration talks about ‘building its own solutions’, a red light goes on in the private sector. The history of Polish public IT is full of projects whose costs ran into billions and whose quality left much to be desired. A symbol of these concerns is the ZUS Comprehensive Information System (KSI ZUS). According to figures from recent years, the maintenance and development of this system over a six-year cycle (2015-2020) cost the state nearly PLN 2.8 billion. What is more, current contracts for the maintenance of KSI ZUS alone amount to hundreds of millions of zlotys (e.g. Asseco’s offer for nearly 350 million zlotys).

    Critics rightly ask: should a state that struggles to manage such molochs efficiently embark on building an ecosystem from scratch to compete with Microsoft 365, which has been fine-tuned over decades? Building a modern office suite is not just a word processor, it involves hundreds of thousands of hours of developer work, security testing and cloud integration. There is a real risk that the ‘national alternative’ will become another bottomless pit, with billions of public money disappearing into it and the end product lagging behind market standards.

    At the same time, it is worth bearing in mind the expert opinion on the quality of the software built by the COI, e.g. on the occasion of mCitizen. Although the application is popular, reports by the Defence CSIRT have pointed to security gaps, such as ‘dead code’ or vulnerabilities in the library supply chain. The scaling of these problems to a system on which every official in the country will depend for their work raises understandable fears.

    Lesson from The Hague: Why sovereignty is not just about austerity

    Arguments about costs are only part of the equation, however. The geopolitical turning point came in May 2025, when the Prosecutor General of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague was to lose access to his Microsoft-provided email account. The official reason was said to be the sanctions imposed by the Donald Trump administration.

    Regardless of the corporation’s subsequent denials, the incident horrified European decision-makers. It became clear that relying on the US SaaS model was not only a matter of convenience, but also an exposure to US extraterritorial law (e.g. CLOUD Act) and the political decisions of a foreign power. It is this fear that is driving migrations today in the German state of Schleswig-Holstein (60,000 posts switching to Linux and LibreOffice) or the Danish Ministry of Digitalisation. In these cases, sovereignty over data is valued more highly than the polished interface of a US-based giant.

    Transparency of savings: The myth of ‘free’ Open Source

    The COI initiative is to be based on open (open source) solutions. This is key, because it lowers the barrier to entry – we don’t have to write everything from scratch, we can draw on projects such as LibreOffice, Collabora Online or Nextcloud. However, in the IT business, ‘open’ rarely means ‘cheap in the short term’.

    Transparency of savings requires an honest look at TCO (Total Cost of Ownership). While the cost of Microsoft’s licences (around £38-49m per year for ZUS alone in 2024/25) is easily measurable, the hidden costs of migration are huge. Germany’s Schleswig-Holstein estimates that it will save €15m per year on licences, but at the same time invest €9m in 2026 alone in the transformation and training process.

    The real cost of the national office suite will be:

    1. training and adaptation: officials accustomed to Outlook can lose productivity drastically in their first year with the new tool.

    2. maintenance and SLA: Open Source requires strong local support teams. Instead of paying Microsoft, we will pay Polish companies (e.g. in a PPP model), which supports the economy but does not necessarily mean a drastic decrease in budget expenditure.

    3 Compatibility: Millions of historical.docx documents and advanced.xlsx worksheets must work flawlessly. The cost of fixing formatting errors can run into the millions.

    European trend: Lyon and Schleswig-Holstein lead the way

    Poland is not alone. Lyon, France’s third-largest city, is already deploying OnlyOffice and Linux on 10,000 workstations, arguing not only for sovereignty but also for ecology – open software allows older hardware to be used for longer. In contrast, the German openDesk project, developed by ZenDiS under the aegis of the German Interior Ministry, is becoming a ready-made standard for the whole of Europe.

    This is where the opportunity for COI lies: not to build the wheel from scratch, but to become a Polish integrator of European sovereign solutions. Using Collaborator Online in conjunction with the Polish government cloud would avoid the fate of ZUS’s KSI, while at the same time providing a guarantee that citizens’ data will never leave the country.

    Value for business

    The COI initiative should be read as a call for diversification. A complete abandonment of Microsoft in commercial enterprises is unlikely today, but building ‘hybrid resilience’ is slowly becoming a necessity.

    This is a huge opportunity for the Polish IT sector. The shift from a model of selling licences (where most of the margin goes to the US) to a model of high-margin implementation and maintenance services around Open Source can be a ‘flywheel’ for domestic integrators. However, business needs to watch the state’s back. If the ‘national package’ is locked within the walls of a single institution, it will become an expensive monument. If, on the other hand, it is built on transparent public-private partnerships and open standards, it can become the foundation of a modern state that invests in its own intellect instead of paying a ‘digital tax’ to giants.

    The key to success will not be the technology – because LibreOffice or OnlyOffice are already ready – but the transparency of how these ‘saved’ millions are spent. True sovereignty is the ability to freely choose technology, not being forced to use software just because it is ‘national’. Poland must prove that it can build systems that are not only expensive, but above all effective.